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ON EQUITABLE NON-ANONYMOUS REVIEW
Abstract. Remco Heesen has recently argued in favor of the editorial practice of
triple-anonymous review on the grounds that \an injustice is committed against
certain authors" under non-anonymous review. On the other hand, he concedes
that the information waste of triple-anonymous review does handicap editors, in
particular sacricing a boost in the average quality of accepted papers that would
otherwise be conferred by non-anonymous review. In this paper it is observed that
by devoting comparatively greater reviewing resources to the papers of unfamiliar
authors, editors practicing non-anonymous review can, without loss of information,
avoid subjecting authors to the sorts of injustices observed by Heesen. Thus they
can reap the eciency gains of non-anonymous review without sacricing fairness.
1. Introduction
Remco Heesen (2018) invites us to consider a simplied scholarly1 community having
a single journal. Scholars submit papers (one each, chosen at random from their
output) to the journal's editor. Some scholars tend to produce better papers than
others. Let i be the mean quality of a paper produced by scholar i, and assume
that i  N(0; 1). That is, if a scholar is chosen at random, then the mean quality
of their papers lies in a standard normal distribution.2 Papers by a xed scholar
meanwhile are assumed to lie in a normal distribution of variance 1. So, if qi is
a random paper produced by scholar i then qi  N(i; 1). The editor sends each
submitted paper out for review, obtaining from the reviewers an aggregate estimate
ri of the quality qi of the paper. Suppose that ri  N(qi; 1). (In particular, the score
is unbiased; its expectation is the actual quality of the paper.) Assume that there
is a threshold q > 0 such that the editor accepts a submitted paper just when her
posterior expectation of its quality is above q; for simplicity I'll take q = 2.
Now it happens3 that E(qijri) = 23ri. Indeed, this is a consequence of the following
theorem. (Take W = qi, so that W = 0 and ff
2
W = 2, and Z = ri  qi, so that ff2Z = 1
and x = W + Z = ri.)
1Heesen speaks of \scientic" communities rather than \scholarly" communities, but the issues
he addresses are relevant more generally.
2I am assuming a variance of 1 for each of the random elements that aect the reported value
ri; Heesen makes no such assumption, but I see no reason not to, as it simplies the presentation
without sacricing any of the qualitative features that make the model interesting.
3An odd feature of this model is that the reviewer herself (should she know the relevant variances)
would, post-review, put the expectation of the paper's quality at 2
3
ri{even though it was she that
estimated the quality of the paper to be ri! So there is a supposition here that reviewers are not
making this sort of post-mortem \regression to the mean" correction prior to submitting their scores.
(I don't nd this supposition realistic; real-life reviewers are conservative; tending in particular to
underestimate the quality of strong papers.) This observation can be glossed over, though, for
if reviewers are doing the post-mortem prior to report and the editor knows this then she can
reconstruct the original \raw" estimate and proceed as in the text.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that W  N(W ; ff2W ) and Z  N(0; ff2Z) are independent.
Then conditional on W + Z = x, W  N( ff2Z
ff2
Z
+ff2
W
W +
ff2
W
ff2
Z
+ff2
W
x;
ff2
W
ff2
Z
ff2
W
+ff2
Z
).
So if the editor's only evidence is the value ri, she will accept the paper if and only if
ri > 3; since Var(ri) = 3, the probability of acceptance is therefore Z(
p
3)  :0416.
But the key feature of Heesen's model is that for some of the papers, the editor does
have additional evidence{she is acquainted with the authors of these papers, in the
sense that she knows, for these authors i, the corresponding values i. (She knows,
for these authors, the average quality of their papers.) Again invoking Theorem
1 (with W = qiji, so that W = i and ff2W = 1, and Z = ri   qi as before),
E(qiji; ri) = i+ri2 . So for the group the editor will accept paper i if and only if
i+ri
2
> 2. Since Var(i+ ri) = Var(2i)+Var(qi i)+Var(ri  qi) = 4+1+1 = 6,
the probability of acceptance is therefore Z( 4p
6
)  :0512.
Heesen concludes: \Thus I have established the surprising result that an editor who
cares only about the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more
papers by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her
friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average."
I contend that this result is not surprising. For conditionalization on any partition
whatsoever would increase (strictly, in all but the extreme case of a partition inde-
pendent of the conditional expectation of the quality of the paper with respect to the
algebra generated by the existing review) the variance of the editor's posterior expec-
tation of the paper's quality.4 And while this does not guarantee an increase in the
probability of acceptance in general,5 it does guarantee this if the editor's posterior
expectation of the paper's quality is itself assumed to have a normal distribution. (As
is the case in Heesen's model.) So the phenomenon on display here is more general.
What causes the acceptance rate in one of the two pools of papers to be higher is
simply that the editor has more information about the papers in that pool.
Heesen opines: \On the one hand, the editor is simply making maximal use of the
information available to her. It just so happens that she has more information about
(scholars) she knows than about others. But that is hardly the editor's fault. Is it
incumbent upon her to get to know the work of every (scholar) who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask." So although he ultimately concludes that the
editor is \ethically and epistemically culpable" for the injustice that some scholars
suer under this system and implicitly recommends that editors should correct this
injustice, his language suggests that the editor's role in the injustice is passive.
4The general claim is that if X is a random variable on probability space (
; ) with E(X) = 0
and A is a ner ff-algebra than B then
R
E(XjA)2 d 
R
E(XjB)2 d. For RHS =
R   R
X dy
2
d(y) =
R   R R
X dyz dy(z)
2
d(y) 
R R   R
X dyz
2
dy(z) d(y) = LHS.
(Here (y) is the decomposition of  over B and (yz) is the decomposition of y over A.)
5Here is a counterexample. Imagine that the editor learns the truth or falsity of the event qi > 1:9,
and nothing else. Then she will accept the paper if and only if qi > 1:9. But if she learned the
true quality, she would accept the paper if and only if qi > 2. So here learning more yields a lower
probability of acceptance.
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Against this, I would say that the editor's role is active. To see why, assume for
the sake of convenience that in the original model two reviewer scores were solicited
and averaged in the computation of ri. (The variance of each of these scores is 2
conditional on qi and they are independent conditional on qi, so their average, ri,
has variance 1 conditional on qi, as described above.) Then she could have achieved
fairness by sending papers written by familiar authors out for review only once.
For in that case Theorem 1 (with W = qiji, so that W = i and ff2W = 1, and
Z = ri   qi, so that ff2Z = 2) would yield a posterior expectation of paper quality
equal to 2i+ri
3
= i +
1
3
(ri   i). So the editor would accept the paper if and only
if i +
1
3
(ri   i) > 2. Since Var(i + 13(ri   i)) = 43 , the implied acceptance rate is
Z(
p
3)  :0416, the same as the acceptance rate in the group of unfamiliar authors.6
What makes the editor's role active, then, is that she chose to send the papers by the
familiar authors out for review a second time. Yes, it \just so happened" that she
started out having more information about papers by scholars that she knows. But
it didn't \just so happen" that things ended up that way. That was her doing.
Concomitantly I disagree with Heesen's recommendation, which is elucidated in: \But
an alternative option is to remove all information about the authors of submitted
papers. This can be done by using a triple-anonymous reviewing procedure, in which
the editor is prevented from using information about (scholars) she knows in her
evaluation." I don't dispute that this levels the playing eld (in theory), but the cost
in wasted information (a debt that must ultimately be cashed out in either a decrease
in quality of accepted papers or the additional sweat of reviewers) is prohibative. A
more ecient way to equalize the prospects of familiar and unfamiliar authors is to
expend comparatively fewer reviewing resources on papers by familiar authors.
This argument doesn't require that the editor is the oracle that Heesen's model
makes her out to be. Its recommendations stand (with weaker eect) in a case
where the editor's estimates of the i are (normally distributed and) unbiased. Since
few real-life editors approximate even this premise, the argument doesn't advocate
strongly for non-anonymous review in practice. I can't resist mentioning however
that mathematics uses non-anonymous review and it seems to work extremely well,
whereas philosophy uses anonymous review and it seems to work extremely badly.
Laying aside more dispiriting hypotheses as to why, Heesen's work indicates a purely
statistical one...even when review is ocially triple anonymous, editors will still know
some authors' identities{comparatively more often for \well-connected" authors. The
ocial reason we give for shopping a paper at talks prior to submission is that such
vetting might improve the papers. Heesen's work indicates a more cynical motive,
however...subversion of the \anonymity" of review. This suggests that (even double)
anonymous review may act more as cover for connection bias than as solution to it.
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